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Last week, this blog discussed how Brexit had resulted in the UK 
taking itself out of the running as a potential location of Tesla’s 
3rd major car manufacturing plant (a so-called “Gigafactory”). I pointed 
out that this was a single, admittedly rather pointed, example of 
investment that the UK has potentially foregone as a result of Brexit. 
This week, I want to touch on an interesting variant of that theme. 
Specifically, I argue that voting for Brexit might have been a rational 
response to recent policy for a significant group of voters, even 
though it makes the UK as a whole worse off. Moreover, I’d venture to 
suggest that this might be true for certain groups even in the event 
that Brexit proves highly damaging (as it probably will be) for key local 
industries. 
Consider the proposed “Gigafactory” that is now to be located in 
Brandenburg and not Britain. The primary beneficiaries will be those 
who work there, those who work in the supply chain and those who 
have invested therein. Consider for a moment who falls into these 
categories. Vehicle manufacture is considerably less labour intensive 
than it was in years gone by, and this is likely to continue as electric 
vehicles become more widely established. 
Moreover, those jobs that are created tend to involve a very different 
skill set to those of yore. The upshot is that many of the potential 
workforce are likely to be more mobile than average (many from 
elsewhere in Europe) and since the work is well-paid they will tend to 
settle in areas locally recognised as salubrious. It is no accident that 
such areas tended to vote to remain in the EU (locally, the district of 
Warwick and Leamington is a prime example of this). 
From an economic standpoint, the EU can be considered an 
exceptionally deep and far-reaching free-trade agreement. In general, 
economists are strongly pro-free-trade and with good reason: it 
provides a net overall benefit and in many cases both countries 
benefit. However, as a profession we have been guilty of failing to 
consider the distributional consequences of this within countries. 
Typically, such concerns are waved away with platitudes: the 
“winners” from free-trade gain more than the “losers” lose and as a 
result the losers can be compensated such that everybody is better 
off. That this is theoretically true, however, does not mean that it has 
happened in practice. It is difficult to properly assess who has gained 
from freer trade and harder still to tax them in a way that does not 
distort incentives. 
The strong political preference for lower taxation and more market-
oriented regulation over the past 40 years has meant that intervention 
of this nature has simply not happened. It might be theoretically 
possible to compensate those who have lost out from political 
changes (globalisation and deeper European integration) but it has 
not happened. 
Indeed, the consequences have been even more problematic for the 
very simple reason that the gainers and losers have not been evenly 
distributed across the country. The upshot is that there are vast 
swathes of the UK that have lost out from the process (and the UK 
has been rather worse at helping such areas than other EU 
countries). 
This process has been exacerbated and intensified by the fact that 
those who are younger, more mobile and more able to acquire new 
skills (as the young tend to be in a position to do) have moved to 
areas that have benefitted from the processes involved in economic 
integration and globalisation. As a result, those who have remained in 
areas that have lost out are typically less able to acquire new skills, 
less mobile, older and more likely to work in (or have retired from) 
“traditional” industries. It is no accident that these are precisely the 
attributes that are typical of many Leave voters. 
The diffuse benefits of freer trade (mostly felt via lower prices) are 
typically not sufficient to compensate for the loss of jobs and hollowing 
out of communities who have lost out to the process. That those same 
communities have simultaneously been harder hit by spending cuts 
over the past decade and have also seen levels of inward migration 
(particularly from post-enlargement EU member states) much higher 
than hitherto experienced has simply added fuel to that particular fire. 
Where London has benefitted enormously from the (admittedly 
incomplete) growth of the Single Market in services (notably in terms 
of passporting for the finance sector and associated professional 
services as well as through things such as the audio-visual media 
services directive) the same cannot be said for many in Sandwell or 
Dudley, for example. 
Moreover, the reason EU membership is so crucial for a number of 
industries is due to the pan-EU nature of their supply chains. By 
definition, this means that a smaller proportion of components are 
locally sourced. Those working in many traditional industries were 
almost certainly never going to be part of Tesla’s supply chain, nor 
were they set to hugely benefit from other investment underpinned by 
membership of the EU. 
Somewhat lower vehicle and food prices, lower-cost holidays and the 
like do not really compensate for the loss of industry to lower-cost 
eastern European producers (or those countries with whom the EU 
has signed FTAs, such as South Korea). For many, much as it might 
damage the country as a whole, voting to leave the EU was not 
irrational nor was it stupid. 
To those who retort that I am simply regurgitating tired tropes about 
poor leave voters in forgotten and “left behind” communities, I would 
retort the following. Not all Leave voters were poor, just as few 
Remain voters are rich. Voting patterns exhibit significant randomness 
and all winning (and indeed most losing) votes are the result of diffuse 
coalitions of interests. After all, even in the most pro-European states 
and communities a significant minority of voters want to leave: witness 
the fact that almost 40% of voters in Scotland voted to leave the EU. 
The reality is that such votes are won and lost at the margins. Had the 
proportion of Leavers in England been 48% instead of 53% (only 10 
percentage points lower), none of the discussions currently taking 
place would be happening. Insofar as the phenomenon being 
discussed was a major contributor to that 5% of voters, it is precisely 
and exactly the reason why the UK is now leaving the EU and why the 
breakup of the UK in response to that is probable. 
 
